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ABSTRACT 
Dispositional beliefs are part of an account of belief-formation and of belief entertaining in view of 
possible action. Belief-formation and belief entertaining are activated from morphological content. So 
dispositional beliefs are activated from morphological content. 
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DISPOSITIONAL BELIEFS NATURALIZATION 
Naturalization of mind is a wide-ranging project, dealing with reduction, elimination and 
compatibilism embracing ways to go. Suppose that there are two substances, the mental and the 
physical. Reductive approach will try to reduce the mental to the physical. Eliminativism will 
try to show that there is nothing substantial that is left after such effort on the side of the mental. 
While compatibilism will try to explain both substances in a wide ranging nonreductive 
manner, that will announce the importance of both areas and their interdependence. 
We think that naturalization of dispositional beliefs is an important case which may show an 
interesting way of naturalizing the mind, and which up till now was under-appreciated. We 
try to give a certain beginning direction to this enterprise. 
First we briefly mention dispositional properties, which in heydays of behaviorism were used 
to shed some light upon beliefs. Ryle [1] and U.T. Place [2] wrote about this, among several 
others. One such property is sugar solubility. We may take a look at the naturalist description 
of the matter. Obviously, sugar has some physical and chemical structure which is such that 
under appropriate conditions its property of solubility will be activated. Notice that surrounding 
circumstances trigger coming into realization of that property. Sugar should be put into water, 
but of course it should not be mixed into the frozen water. The temperature should be such 
that the sugar will dissolve. Some people had their concerns about dispositional properties, 
one of these being that the explanation of dispositional propensity may be circular. They 
reminded us of Molière’s depiction of medical doctors, explaining the effectivity of sleeping 
pill by evoking virtu dormitiva, the sleeping ability. Of course, Molière despises some guys 
from his times trying to profit from people’s ignorance. Obviously, what Molière wished for 
as against these was a naturalized account of property with some explanatory dignity. 
One could take belief to be a kind of dispositional property as well. For we have all the time 
dormant beliefs which get activated in appropriate contextual circumstances. If I talk with 
you and you remind me of the existence of squirrels, my squirrels related belief will come to 
the fore. Looking for naturalization explanatory support in such a case we can observe two 
directions: the naturalistically specifiable basis of the belief in my brain, or again the 
naturalistically specifiable basis that triggered my dispositional belief to appear in an 
occurrent shape in the environment of community. Neither of these, it seems to us, will 
provide an adequate basis for dispositional belief’s naturalization. 
In what follows we will try to sketch a possible departure for dispositional belief’s naturalization 
in as far as the naturalization of mind is concerned, knowing full well that a naturalistic account 
related to community is important, having to do with contextual normative circumstances. 
Saying that naturalization basis of dispositional belief is the physical underlying system that 
allows for belief to be stored and to appear under appropriate circumstances leads to views of 
emergence or of supervenience. The difference is that the emergence of mental properties one 
of which is the mentioned belief succeeds upon a physical basis without that an explanation 
involving general natural laws would be involved. As British emergentists say, we should 
acknowledge the appearance of the mental upon a certain physical arrangement with religious 
piety. The supervenience to the contrary provides a general natural law based explanation, 
with the minimal requirement that identical physical arrangements will produce identical 
mental arrangements, such as that of occurrent belief. Both emergentism and supervenience 
are compatible with the relation between physical and mental structures, just that explanation 
in accordance with natural laws is available just in the second case. 
But naturalization of dispositional belief stays restricted. We propose the following in order 




will distinguish between its function in belief-formation on the one hand, and between its 
function in belief entertaining in view of possible action. In this manner, we introduce two 
different accents into our investigation, in respect to the dispositional belief’s role. The stress in 
belief-formation namely is upon the causal environment, the space of causes. Here we have to 
do with the role that dispositional belief plays in categorization of the encountered stimuli. 
Dispositional beliefs on the other hand can motivate our actions, and this has to do with the 
normative space of reasons. In the first case dispositional belief provides reason for 
categorization, and in the second case it provides reasons for possible action. I see a cup of tea 
on my table and I form belief that there is a cup of tea, using dormant categorizing capabilities 
of my corresponding dispositional belief. The formation of this belief and its dispositional storage 
gives me the ability to reach for the cup of tea and take a sip, even after an hour or so since I 
have formed the belief. Dispositional belief will then shape the direction of my possible actions. 
It seems that the simple physical basis – the structure of mind relatedness is not sufficient for 
a viable naturalization of dispositional belief. We claim that an appropriate naturalization of 
dispositional belief is possible if we envision a middle dynamical level of cognitive system’s 
description. Just such an approach will offer appropriate naturalization basis for dispositional 
belief. The introduction of middle level between physical and mental realms is nothing 
special. We talk about three levels of description concerning cognitive systems: the 
description at the physical level, the one at the upper cognitive level, but there is as well the 
description at the middle level establishing relation between the physical and the mind. A 
viable naturalization of mind, again, requires an introduction of middle level. We believe that 
this level is dynamical, and that it cannot be described by exceptionless general rules. 
Naturalization of dispositional belief thus requires middle level of cognitive system’s 
description dynamics. Cognitive background enabling appropriate naturalization of 
dispositional belief is at the dynamical middle level of cognitive system’s description. Given 
that dynamics is involved, the appropriate naturalistic description of the middle level is 
mathematical and not inferential, representations and exceptionless rules involving one. 
We will proceed with a sketch of an argument first, along the following lines. Dispositional 
beliefs are part of an account of belief-formation and of belief entertaining in view of 
possible action. Belief-formation and belief entertaining are activated from morphological 
content. So dispositional beliefs are activated from morphological content. 
DISPOSITIONAL BELIEFS ARE PART OF AN ACCOUNT OF BELIEF 
FORMATION AND OF BELIEF ENTERTAINING IN VIEW OF 
POSSIBLE ACTION 
I believe that there is a cup of tea in front of me on the table. And I believe that it would be 
appropriate for me to help a person in need. The first of these beliefs is descriptive and I have 
acquired it through my perceptual capabilities. The second one is normative and I take it to be 
the result of my cultural environment and educational impact. As I write these lines, I form 
the first of these beliefs, for I notice the cup being positioned left of my computer. This belief 
was brought into the center of my attention once as I felt that I needed some tea, looked for a 
cup, and spotted it. Then I said to myself: “Well here is the cup.” Then I took a sip of tea. As 
follow-up of all this, the belief concerning cup became occurrent, it took the position of my 
total cognitive state at this very moment. The other mentioned belief of mine, about the 
appropriateness to help the people in need, was not occurrent at that time. Rather, it was 
sitting there in my background belief system, waiting for a suitable occasion to trigger it, so 
that it would then become an occurrent belief. At a certain moment in time I only form one 
occurrent belief. Other beliefs are there in the just mentioned belief system, waiting in the 




sense of the word. I believe that cats are four legged animals. But I did not believe this in an 
occurrent manner before my attention was driven to it. So up to this point in time the 
mentioned belief was dispositional, slumbering in the background of my cognitive system. 
Each of these dispositional beliefs is waiting for a suitable context or circumstances so that it 
would be able to enter my attention. Dispositional properties such as that of sugar being 
soluble enter upon the scene once as the environmental circumstances are appropriate. Sugar 
has its solubility property all the time as it is waiting in the dispenser. But the dispositional 
property only comes to life in suitable circumstances, such as when I put a spoonful of sugar 
into my cup of warm tea. Similarly, dispositional or standing beliefs become occurrent when 
I encounter appropriate contextual circumstances. 
First we have to take a look at the status of belief. What differentiates belief from the content 
– which may be featured in this belief? What makes the belief that there is a cup different 
from the psychological content figuring the cup? The answer may be that content is an objective 
commodity, and that entertaining such content may be seen as a shared enterprise in which several 
of us can take part. Such an objective kind of content – perhaps proposition – entertaining and 
sharing may be then quantitatively compared and traded, and it may be called credency [3]. If 
myself and you disagree in respect to some of our our credences, we may compare their 
quantitative impact, each of us giving way to the other, and we then finally conciliate in 
direction of a middle ground. This is not the case with beliefs though, for we hold these in an 
all or nothing manner. We will not be easily ready to give up on our beliefs, until there is 
something such as an underlying change occurring in our overall attitudes. Our political beliefs 
may be a case in point. As well there is quite a changed perturbation of my system when I 
discover that something that I believed to be a hamster is actually a rat1. We are inclined to 
take beliefs that we entertain, in dispositional and then in occurrent manner, to be part of our 
rationality, and thus to be our cherished property. They are not something objective but rather 
a first person point of view matter. This goes for dispositional and occurrent beliefs. Some of 
these are linked to normative pressures that we comply to, and others to the goal of truth. The 
evaluation of beliefs, however, in counter distinction to that of credences, succeeds through 
phenomenological experience of beliefs inhabiting the space of reasons, although they may 
well be produced in the environment proper to the space of causes [4]. 
The question now is whether dispositional beliefs have some role to play in my belief-formation, 
and in my entertaining beliefs in view of a possible action [5]. Belief-formation of factual 
beliefs happens in the space of causes. We start with factual beliefs because they avoid 
discussion of possible realist commitments proper to normative or moral beliefs. Perceptual 
belief would be a case in point. I form factual belief about a chair being over there by observing 
the chair, thus entering in causal relation to it. But this external causal relation is not sufficient 
for my formation of the mentioned belief. Although chair is in the same causal relation to myself 
as I am in respect to it, it is more than doubtful whether it would be able to form a belief about 
myself being there2. An answer is that myself, in counter distinction to the chair, possess the 
ability to categorize features and entities that I happen to encounter. But just what would this 
ability consist in? One answer at hand is that it is there in dispositional content, in my 
dispositional belief involving the chair. But is this explanation circular, given that belief-formation 
concerning the chair relies upon the dispositional general belief about the chair? The 
explanation is not circular because of the following. We try to explain belief-formation, 
namely how a belief gets formed, dealing here with factual perceptual occurrent belief as the 
result of this process. But occurrent belief is not dispositional belief3. And dispositional belief 
just helps occurrent belief to be formed by offering categorization support for it. Besides to 
the external causal support of relation with the chair, there is as well the support of dispositional 




moment, in a fraction of a second. Dispositional belief about the chair that is there in my 
overall belief system enables me to form perceptual belief about the chair4. Connection between 
the stimulus that is coming to my system and between the dispositional belief allowing me to 
recognize it is of the predominantly causal nature, perhaps quasi-causal would be an adequate 
term for describing it. There is no substantial inferential process involved into such recognition 
and categorization, it rather proceeds kind of reflex-like. Dispositional belief is a belief all 
right, but it acts in a directly active causal manner by providing categorization to the 
encountered stimuli. The usual perceptual belief-formation that we talk about here is of course 
different from my original belief-formation which allowed me to form the now existing 
dispositional belief in the first place. At that time I had to learn what a chair is, and such a 
learning is portrayed as consisting of several hundred trials at least in the proceedings of 
connectionist networks. Once the category is learned though and once as the dispositional 
belief gets formed, there is the ability to apply categorization to the possible vague encountered 
approximations of the category in one’s surroundings. This is a brief account about how 
dispositional belief is involved in formation of perceptual beliefs. Dispositional belief provides 
ability to form an occurrent belief, through the quasi-causal impact of categorization. 
There is as well the role of dispositional belief in belief entertaining in view of a possible 
action. Beliefs that are stored in my cognitive system wait for an appropriate occasion where 
they can eventually lead to my action. These are dispositional beliefs as well. But their role is 
different to the one that they take in categorization which is linked to belief-formation. Now 
we deal with the motivational role of beliefs. Once the motivational role is recognized in 
dispositional beliefs, its direction is not easily reversed. As it is customary for dispositional 
matters, dispositional beliefs exercise their possible agentive role in contextually appropriate 
circumstances. In belief-formation, standing or dispositional beliefs have categorization role 
and in this sense they figure as reasons for categorization of the encountered items. They are 
thus partial reason of belief-formation. Dispositional beliefs are as well reasons for action, 
for a possible action, and this is quite a different role from the former categorizing one. 
Dispositional beliefs inhabit the background cognitive system, or belief-system. There is 
presupposition that they are atomistic entities, with a role that is close to propositions which 
enter into inferential relations, sometimes with other supposed entities such as desires. If I 
undergo a desire to drink some beer, and if I also entertain belief that the beer is in the fridge, 
then I am motivated to go to the fridge and fetch myself a can of beer. Believing p and as 
well believing p → q brings me to believe q. Dispositional beliefs look to be like pebbles 
waiting to be involved into the game of inferential links. 
BELIEF-FORMATION AND BELIEF ENTERTAINING ARE ACTIVATED 
FROM MORPHOLOGICAL CONTENT 
Given that beliefs are part of one’s cognitive, psychological constitution, it is a pertinent 
question what kind of model is appropriate as an account of human cognition. Often, rationality 
of human psychological processes is emphasized, and inferential processes are provided as a 
model. Beliefs are then taken to be atomistic ingredients fitting into rationality engaging 
inferential relations. They also provide reasons for the inferential flow to carry on. Language 
of thought5 [6] would be one such model, where representations end up as atomistic points 
pushed around by inferential relations. Language of thought model of mind was inspired by the 
classical computational von Neumann architecture, trading on rules and representations. Rules 
in such a system need to be tractable, and the supposed atomistic nature of representations 
helps them comply with this direction. Such classical computational model has advantage of 




As against classical computational architecture inspired model of mind, the so called 
connectionist or parallel distributed processes involving systems were proposed, inspired by 
connections between neurons and their intertwined paths such as these that may be found in 
human brain. Connectionist approach is not inferential rationality friendly as was the 
representations and rules involving model. Rather, direct responses to the encounters of the 
system with its surroundings and empirical reactions are important here. Learning as repeated 
exposure to stimuli with their always changing details is embraced. Through such exposure 
patterns are learned by the system. System recognizes patterns after repeated encounter with 
them in variable conditions. 
Three levels of cognitive systems’ description were proposed [7]. The upper level figures 
representations. The lower level takes care about physical implementation of the system. 
Whereas the middle level of system’s description provides mechanisms enabling and 
regulating appearances at the upper level. In the classical computational model of mind, 
inferential links are to be found at the middle level, determining the appearance of presentations 
as total cognitive states at the upper level of the system’s description. Mechanisms at the 
middle level of cognitive system’s description enabling appearances of total cognitive states 
at the upper level are different in connectionist networks and in abstract dynamical systems 
that are inspired by these. Such an approach allows for dynamics and it does not depend upon 
rules6. Once as one presupposes the existence of a dynamical system at the middle level of 
system’s description, the appearance of total cognitive states at the upper level gets supported 
by dynamical interactions. Following such a departure one may doubt that total cognitive 
states are atomistic and that they appear as the result of activities guided by classical 
inferential relations. Rather, patterns or representations are positioned in their dispositional 
form at the middle level of dynamical system’s description as attraction points. Once as 
forces at the multi-dimensional landscape navigate towards a certain point with sufficient 
insistence so that they make a momentary stop there, this one is displayed at the upper level 
as a total cognitive state. This intractable dynamical middle level of the system that is 
inspired by but is not identical to the connectionist network’s computational architecture, 
may be called morphological content [8, 9]. Morphological content is an overall dynamical 
system including everything that one knows, which is not occurrently but dispositionally 
positioned in the background of the multi-dimensional landscape. Innumerable possible 
activation points at the dynamical multi-dimensional potential activation landscape may be 
seen as dispositional beliefs. This holistic background is not tractable and neither is it itself 
explicitly presented at the upper level of total cognitive states. Multi-dimensional landscape 
is inspired by connectionist networks whose activation environment consists of numerous 
potential directions, called dimensions. Such a landscape is not presented at the upper level of 
system’s description, at least not in a direct manner. But it is again present there in the way 
that it chromatically illuminates total cognitive states once as they appear at the upper level7. 
We may now say that dispositional beliefs are embedded into this dynamical morphological 
content at the multi-dimensional landscape proper to the middle level of system’s description. 
They are positioned as activation points at this dynamical landscape. As system of 
dispositional beliefs they exercise their impact upon each of their peers, as well as at the 
upper level featuring total cognitive states. This presence of morphological content has an 
impact upon both belief-formation and upon belief entertaining in view of a possible action. 
Why should atomistic nature of beliefs be abandoned? This hangs together with the 
dynamical nature of cognitive system such as it is there. Notice that one faces a constant 
influx of information which one experiences. Although I am in my room that is really static 
as compared to a crowded city street or windy and steep mountain path, there is abundance of 




constantly changing, following the interplay of sun rays with the moving clouds. There is 
some sound that I barely hear from the nearby room, the typing sound of my keyboard, and 
so many other humming alterations. I also experience my position of sitting in my chair as I 
type, the specific warmth of the air, the pressure of my body upon the chair exercised by 
gravity. All these and many more pieces information are coming to me all the time. Some of 
these are noticed and other build the background which enables this noticing to occur. All 
along this, some of information is stored in my system, whereas so much more of it is there in 
what may be described as an unconscious manner. Notice that cognitive system goes on with 
its activity all the time. Even during the night as I sleep there are some dreams, and 
information in my background keeps to be reshuffled. Some of this information is accessible 
to consciousness under some circumstances, and some information in the system is not so 
accessible. Considering all this, it is plausible that beliefs, such as dispositional beliefs, are in 
the grip of dynamical information impact all the time. But there is as well constancy in 
beliefs, according to their content that allows their categorization role to unfold itself. 
The holistic Quinean picture can be of help here. Perhaps the most important question for 
Quine was that of explaining how the information that we empirically gather at our receptive 
surfaces (audible, visual and the like) ends up constituting the shape of our developed theories. 
His criticism of analytic – synthetic distinction proposed the picture of scientific theory as a 
bunch of concentric circles, whose kernel consists of basic axioms that cannot be abandoned, 
such as the law of noncontradiction, and whose borders are under constant impact of empirical 
information [10] (just as we have described it for our perceptual situation as well). These 
external matters have impact upon outer embedded circles, but in principle their transformative 
force does not touch the kernel. But kernel itself may also be transformed once as the impact 
of the outer information comes about with sufficient strength. This is a picture of Quinean 
holism that can now help us to explain the position of dispositional beliefs. 
First we take a look at belief system. Each of dispositional beliefs inhabiting it is under 
constant dynamical pressure. Dispositional beliefs as points at the activation landscape may 
come into dynamically ever new relations, given that their distance at this landscape is 
constantly varied under pressure of incoming information, reshuffling the situation. This can 
give a picture of the background morphological content upon which dispositional beliefs or 
potential total cognitive states are positioned as so many attraction points. 
Each dispositional belief itself, again, may be depicted as consisting of invariable kernel with 
the surrounding border where there is constant impact of incoming information from the 
system. But even the kernel of such a dispositional belief can be put under question if there is 
sufficient pressure on the periphery. This gives an idea about belief’s constancy once it is 
there in the morphological background. Belief may be changed though once as the impact of 
the entire environment that it inhabits is altered. 
This goes for belief-formation, where the dispositional belief will imprint its mark upon the 
incoming information, by categorizing it. The dispositional belief’s kernel will be active here, 
providing justification for categorization. The entertaining of belief is even closer to the holistic 
kernel and periphery picture, showing the tendency of beliefs to persist in its kernel, all along 
the peripheral accommodation, encompassing such matters as belief’s vagueness. In 
entertaining belief as reason for a possible action, there is motivation attached to its relatively 
unchangeable kernel. Just under sufficient pressure from the periphery will there eventually 
come the change of motivational direction provided by belief. In such cases, the whole of 
belief system would change in order that that belief’s kernel will display different motivational 
weight. All this becomes manifest once as both belief-formation and entertaining of beliefs in 




morphological content shaped belief-system, with its kernel and periphery involving 
structure. Both kernel of the dynamical system and its peripheral pressures may as well be 
used for an account of dispositional belief’s vagueness. There is no wimpy boundary that 
would account for the possible qualitative transitions. Anyway, morphological content 
dynamical nature fits well the behavior of dispositional beliefs. As attraction points at the 
multi-dimensional landscape they offer stable categorization support in belief-formation, and 
motivational support for possible actions. Holistic morphological background exercises its 
causal impact in the categorization case, and it is reasonable impact in the motivational case. 
THEREFORE, DISPOSITIONAL BELIEFS ARE ACTIVATED FROM 
MORPHOLOGICAL CONTENT 
What are dispositional beliefs if we take a look at them from the holistic dynamical 
background system of the morphological content perspective? They are activation points at 
the multi-dimensional activational landscape of morphological content. There are ongoing 
pressures all around them, as the system changes under experientially incoming variation, all 
in trying to preserve the needed constancy, both as a whole, and in respect to its many activation 
points. The expression morphological content turns our attention away from the implications 
of the name belief system, which aims to depict individual beliefs as atomistic entities that 
form a net through substantially inferential relations. Perhaps this is close to the coherentist 
epistemic quantitative graded support picture, with its displacing the evidential support from 
its privileged place8. Once we take morphological content as our departure, we can realize 
that there is constant pressure exercised in respect to a certain dispositional belief, from the 
dynamical happenings in the system as a whole, and in some of its regions. Dispositional 
belief is namely something such as a point positioned at the multi-dimensional dynamical 
activational landscape. The surroundings of a certain point, of one specific dispositional 
belief, will be agitated and partially transformed as the dispositional belief will adopt its 
occurrent role, be it in belief-formation, or in belief’s motivational entertainment. So periphery 
of that point changes all the time, supporting through its variation in a kind of adaptive darwinian 
spirit the constant kernel of dispositional belief through its adaptive activity. The beliefs’ kernel 
stability increases as it complies to the changed support through its surrounding landscape. 
What is the activational role of morphological content in belief-formation? Dispositional 
belief is a floating point at the morphological landscape. As it is used for categorization of 
encountered items or features, its persistence increases. If there is a link between activation of 
one point leading to another point in classical terms this may be called inferential relation. 
But in the morphological content dynamical perspective inferential relation is just one 
between several supporting relations. A special and important case belongs to the chromatic 
illumination that comes as an indirect qualitative impact upon a certain dispositional belief 
from its surrounding. Inferential relation is just a certain link between the positioned points, 
which comes embedded into dynamical background surrounding, this impact showing itself 
in an indirect qualitative illuminating manner. 
As a certain point at the morphological landscape becomes a reason, this time not for 
categorization, but for a possible action, its surrounding (the surrounding of this dispositional 
belief point) provides motivational direction to the agent who entertains such a dispositional 
belief. Motivation of a certain belief therefore again relies on an indirect impact that the 
point’s, the dispositional belief’s surrounding, namely the embedding multi-dimensional 
landscape, exercises in its respect. If I am motivated to go hiking, this specific hiking-belief 
comes as embedded in relation to several other points at the landscape, such as my awareness 
of hiking impact upon my health prospect and many more reasons that I can think about as 




this regard, the activation points, gets boosted through the background connections related to 
other points, to other dispositional beliefs at the landscape, as forming of habitual connections 
and patterns. The formation of such patterns itself displays impact of the morphological 
content. Notice that patterns in question may link different dispositional beliefs as activation 
points between themselves, occasionally producing a new point, a new dispositional belief. 
The fact that morphological background landscape with the morphological content activates 
beliefs opens a question about such dispositional belief’s justification through such activity. 
Justification is an epistemic matter. There is a thesis that justified belief provides justification 
for action, except for what may be called deviant cases [11]. But justification for a certain 
belief comes from the support of this belief from its surroundings, encompassing such matters 
as gettierized worries. And this surrounding is a feature of morphological content, 
dynamically weighing and supporting a certain dispositional belief as activation point at the 
multi-dimensional activation landscape. From here morphological content activates 
justification profile of dispositional beliefs. 
What about belief-formation? It would be quite implausible to look at categorization ability 
of dispositional belief, in face of encountered situations, as happening without support of its 
environment, in kind of atomistic manner. To the contrary, categorization, especially in 
variable perceptual circumstances say, will be successful just in case there will be the impact 
of the activation point’s surrounding landscape, chromatically illuminating the encountered 
scene. So again it is morphological content that activates dispositional belief.  
REMARKS 
1Forming of a pattern in this background sense exercises its influence upon appearance of 
1specific patterns as total cognitive states, and upon the shape of their dispositional 
1storage.Compare patterns coming to surface in moral belief formation. Phenomenological 
1experience of moral judgment formation is provided by Koehler’s friend Maurice 
1Mandelbaum [12]. Here is a story told to us by an old lawyer friend. On the occasion of his 
1Thai vacation a guy saw a nice looking hamster and took him home as a pet. Then one day 
1his cat disappeared. He took the hamster to the vet, and this one said: “Where the hell you 
1have got this creature? It is a kind of oriental rat, so no wonder he ate the cat.” 
2In terms of intentional relation, the question to be answered here is to explain how it is 
2possible that I form a belief about the chair, whereas the chair is not able to form belief 
2about myself. Chisholm [13] posed this question, answering with the primacy of intentional 
2upon the basis of an evidential relation. 
3By the very nature of dispositional belief this one is general in respect to its content, which is 
3different from specific occurrent beliefs. Categorization ability of dispositional belief goes 
3together with its functional generality. 
4The categorization contribution of dispositional belief to the formation of occurrent belief succeeds 
4in a reflex-like, intuition displaying manner. This shows dispositional belief’s effectivity in 
4categorization to be causal-like and to proceed by avoiding inferential step-wise manners. 
5Language of thought rationalist model is opposed to behaviorist and pragmatist trends. Both 
5atomistic representations and inferential setting provide reasons for functioning of 
5computational processes. Systematizability and productivity provide basis to the structure. 
6Dynamical system is described mathematically by arithmetic means and not by the logical 
6inferential relations. 
7Chromatic illumination may be illustrated by the sources of light that illuminate the scene, 
7providing a specific qualitative feeling to it, without that they would be themselves depicted in the 
7scene. This approach may be used to describe the impact that reasons exercise upon our actions. 
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